

Chapter 1 Table of Criticisms

	Target	Key Concepts	How They Fail to Address the Normative Question
Voluntarists	Samuel Pufendorf	Moral obligations stem from the commands of an authoritative sovereign.	Korsgaard criticizes Pufendorf for reducing moral obligations to mere commands backed by the threat of sanctions, arguing that this view fails to capture the inherent moral reasoning behind obligations.
	Thomas Hobbes	Believes that moral laws derive their authority solely from the power of a sovereign to enforce them.	She challenges Hobbes' view that moral obligations are valid only if imposed by a powerful sovereign, pointing out that this undermines the moral autonomy and the inherent value of ethical actions.
Realists	Samuel Clarke	Argues that moral truths are objectively real and can be known through rational intuition.	Korsgaard questions Clarke's assumption that moral truths are self-evident and exist independent of human interaction, critiquing his failure to explain why these truths should necessarily influence human reasoning and actions.
	Richard Price	Maintains that moral values are intrinsic facts about the world, discoverable through human reason.	She criticizes Price for assuming that moral realities are fixed and discoverable without considering the subjective processes involved in ethical reasoning and judgment.
	H. A. Prichard	Asserts that moral obligations are self-evident and known intuitively.	Korsgaard finds Prichard's reliance on intuition problematic, arguing that it fails to address why moral obligations are compelling beyond the claim of self-evidence.
	G. E. Moore	Advocates for the non-natural properties of moral qualities, which are known through moral intuition.	She challenges Moore's non-naturalism, questioning the practical relevance of claiming that moral properties are both non-natural and intuitively evident.

Realists (cont)	W. D. Ross	Proposes that there are prima facie duties which are self-evident and intuitively known.	Korsgaard criticizes Ross for not providing a sufficient explanation for why these prima facie duties should command rational assent beyond their intuitive appeal, which does not address deeper normative questions.
	Thomas Nagel	Suggests that moral judgments are grounded in objective reasons that are independent of personal views.	Korsgaard argues that Nagel's reliance on the objectivity of reasons does not adequately address how these reasons are compelling in themselves without a subjective engagement with moral deliberation and choice.